INTERVIEW: Capt. Herbert Chancy, 05321797, Commanding Officer, Company A.

Question: Where did your principal attack come from?
Answer: We were attacked straight from the east at the extreme right of my perimeter. It was fairly heavy, especially with RPG fire.

Question: Were you penetrated?
Answer: Around 0200 hours, 2 or 3 VC got through just about the time I lost radio contact with 16 on that side. Bravo Companyís reserve force of two platoons filled in the gap in that portion of the perimeter and it was held. Eventually commo was re-established.

Question: What artillery did you have?
Answer: Since the 105mm was firing in support of Company C, we took the only thing we could get which was a 155mm gun. It fired direct fire just over our bunkers and the HE cleared out many of the VC that might otherwise have gotten through.

Question: What was one of your effective defenses?

Answer: We fired all our 90mm RR canister rounds and blew well over 50 claymore mines. My LP blew one claymore mine after which they found 10 dead VC lined up in front of it the next morning.

Question: How did the LPís communicate?
Answer: I had radio with two of them all night; I lost commo with one LP.

Question: What were your casualties?
Answer: We didnít make the morning sweep, so we could only count what was within 30 meters of the position. There were 21 VC KIA (BC); I had 4 KIA and 23 WIA.

INTERVIEW: Capt. Robert Hemphill, Commanding Officer, Company B.

Question: What was your mission?
Answer: I only had one platoon on the perimeter. One platoon was an AP on the road and two were reserve.

Question: When did the AP first spot the VC moving south?

Answer: About 2330 hours they reported large numbers of VC moving toward us and didnít think it was wise to engage them because of the numbers.

Question: Did they ever fire?
Answer: During the night the VC kept moving back and forth past them. Eventually they were compromised and triggered the ambush killing 4 VC. In the morning a heavy blood trail was found indicating that 1 or 2 others were seriously wounded.

Question: When were you called to reinforce A Company?
Answer: About 0300 hours I got word that the VC had broken through A Companyís perimeter so I sent my two reserve platoons who filled in the gap and held the perimeter intact.

Question: What were casualties both sides?
Answer: I had 1 KIA and 21 WIA. We counted 4 VC in front of the AP and in front of the bunkers on the north.

OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:
  1. The well built bunker, utilizing a deep foxhole with heavy overhead cover contributed to the ability of the positions to withstand countless mortar rounds, RPG hits and small arms fire.
  2. The employment of direct fire from artillery, the HE and especially the Beehive proved invaluable in the support of the perimeter and prevented the VC from breaking through the perimeter due to sheer force of numbers.
  3. Claymores in front of bunkers were a valuable defense.
  4. LPís proved to be the only early warning of the size and eminence of the attack.
  5. In the Company C area the VC were too close to positions and Beehive was so intense that the 90ís could not be fired.
  6. Air strikes and the precision of the bombs kept the majority of the attackers from getting close enough to attack with as great a capability as their numbers could have had the capacity for doing.
  7. Gun ships arrived too late to turn the initial attack.
  8. Artillery and Puff furnished good flare support since illumination was vital for defense.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
GERALD T. BROWN
CAPT., INF
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